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1. Introduction 
Residential segregation was first created in South Africa by the Apartheid regime between the 
1940s and the 1950s of the twentieth century, when black people were forced to live in delimited 
areas in the suburbs of the South African cities. Although the Apartheid regime ended more than 
twenty years ago, economic and residential segregation is still at work in the townships around the 
main cities of the country, where millions of people strive to escape from poverty. Notwithstanding 
the hard living conditions in these areas, one positive legacy of the segregation period has been to 
provide a spatial and social basis for cohesion and cooperative behaviors among townships residents 
(World Bank 2014). 
Understanding the effects of segregation on cooperation is not an easy task. In fact, on the one 
hand people living in distressed areas may suffer the consequences of harmful neighborhood, such as 
greater criminal involvement, worse educational, economic and health outcomes (e.g. Ludwig et al. 
2012). On the other hand, spatially concentrated disadvantaged areas may enhance “collective 
efficacy”, i.e. the willingness of community residents to work together to cooperate and comply with 
shared norms on education and family/work stability (Sampson, Morenoff and Gannon-Rowley 
2002). 
In this paper we provide new evidence on whether segregation affects community members’ 
levels of cooperation to a public good. We analyze the behavior of various groups of inhabitants of 
three townships of Cape Town. The case is particularly interesting because the prolonged and forced 
cohabitation in the same disadvantaged areas may have pushed its inhabitants (mostly black) to 
develop mechanisms of mutual aid to mitigate the exacerbated opportunistic behaviors typical of 
distressed population. Thus, given the high levels of unemployment and poverty in these suburbs, 
disentangling the incentives to cooperation can be a very useful tool to promote local development. 
We conduct a lab-in-the-field experiment in three townships (Langa, Philippi and Khayelitsha) 
located in the suburbs of Cape Town and populated by black Africans. In the terminology of Harrison 
and List (2004), our study is an artefactual field experiment as our subject pool is non-standard (that 
is, non-students). 
The paper is the first lab-in-the-field experiment conducted in a township.1 Beyond this, it 
provides several novelties with respect to the existing literature. First, we differ from most standard 
lab experiments on public goods, because we do not “build” artificial groups but we involve groups 
that are already operating in the townships. This allows us to introduce another source of novelty: in 
                                                          
1 Kocher, Martinsson and Visser (2012) run a lab linear public goods experiment involving four high school students in 
Cape Town, including one school located in Langa and one school in Rondebosch for black students from Khayelitsha and 
Gugulethu townships. 
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our work, the public good is an indivisible sum of money that the group agrees to spend for its 
common activities, instead of being split among participants as typically occurs in lab experiments. 
Our experiment is designed to reproduce a set of decisions on how each member of the group 
allocates a certain endowment between a private or a public account, where “public” refers to the 
group the subjects belong to. We manipulate two key features of this allocation decision. In the first 
treatment we compare the degree of cooperation in the decision process heading to the choice of the 
public good: the decision is taken by a leader, or by the group through a public discussion, or by the 
group through private voting. In the second treatment we introduce and compare individual vs. 
collective monetary incentives as prizes for a minimum level of cooperation (“participatory 
incentives”). The latter manipulation mimics the mechanisms of the community-led development 
programs which require, in general, a personal monetary commitment by the community members 
involved. Moreover, it is designed to explore the effects of leadership when interacted with 
incentives. 
The experiment involved 269 subjects, belonging to 10 groups already operating in the 
townships, differing in their mission, frequency of interaction and characteristics of their members. 
We are able to control for several personal and group features. These derive from a capillary survey 
we conducted on participants’ social status, job, type of dwelling, family composition, degree of 
education, living conditions and participation in the everyday life of the local community, together 
with information on group characteristics and values. 
On average the contribution level reached 45% of the individual endowment, a relevant 
percentage considering their high degree of deprivation of the subjects involved. The analysis 
highlights that two mechanisms of social influence are particularly effective in prompting 
cooperation: leadership guidance and participatory incentives.  
In detail, we find three results. In the first treatment, subjects contribute significantly more 
when the leader is required to take the decision on how to spend the sum collected as public good 
(about 29% of the endowment), rather than having the group discuss publicly or vote privately on the 
allocation decision (17%). Second, in the treatment with participatory incentives, the average 
contribution reaches 62%, significantly higher than the average of the previous scenario. Third, in 
both treatments the leader contributes more than the average of the group. All our results are robust to 
the inclusion of several characteristics of the participants and of their groups. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews the related relevant 
literature. Section 3 describes the main features of the specific context analyzed. Section 4 describes 
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the experimental design, while the results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 
concludes.  
 
2.  Related literature 
From a methodological perspective, the game explored here can be classified as a collective-
action game (Dixit and Skeath 1999), which arises when local public goods (“bads”) must be 
produced (prevented). The players involved belong to a community institution, which is defined as “a 
group small enough to allow good circulation of information among its members who interact more 
or less continuously over infinite or indeterminate periods of time” (Platteau and Abraham 2002). 
The paper provides relevant novelties with respect to the existing studies on leadership in 
collective-action games. The first strand of related literature is the experimental evidence on social 
dilemmas using the “leadership-by-example” mechanism (Güth et al. 2007), where the leader decides 
and announces his contribution before the other group members make their contribution choices. A 
series of experimental articles in this framework finds that leadership significantly raises the average 
contribution levels compared to the cases of no leadership or to the leader’s cheap talk suggestions to 
team members (leadership “by suggestion”, as in Sahin, Eckel and Komai 2015). Note that typically 
in these games the leadership position is assigned exogenously, for example after the random 
selection among the subjects. 
Differently from these studies, we do not need to artificially instill the leadership role by 
“example” because we use naturally existing groups where the leader emerges endogenously.2 This 
relationship between the leader’s contribution and his group members’ – without a leading-by-
example sequential mechanism at work – has not been investigated yet. If a significant correlation 
exists, it might depend on the fact that leadership influence is embedded in the group’s own history. 
Indeed, in our experiments we find that the leader’s behavior significantly explains the 
contribution levels of the other members. In this sense, our results are close to the experimental 
evidence in games with simultaneous contributions by all group members. In these interactions a 
positive correlation emerges among members’ cooperation levels due to mechanisms of social 
influence and conformity to others’ behavior (e.g. Croson and Shang 2005; Fischbacher and Gächter 
2010) or if a social norm arises (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004; Faillo, Grieco and Zarri 2013). 
                                                          
2 Relevant examples of “endogenous leader appointment” include the following cases: a) the leader is selected from a 
ranking of an earlier task on skills (e.g. Kumru and Versterlund 2005) or on contribution levels (e.g. Gächter and Renner 
2014); b) the potential leader voluntarily self-selects into the role (Arbak and Villeval 2013); c) leadership emerges as the 
outcome of a voting stage where subjects express their preference on institution with or without an (informed) leader 
(Potters, Sefton and Vesterlund 2005). 
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Within the leadership-by-example literature, the paper closest in methodology to our 
investigation is by Jack and Recalde (2015), who conduct an artifactual field experiment, involving 
52 communities in rural Bolivia, to study the role of different forms of leadership. They compare 
randomly assigned leadership to the case when the leader is the formal community authority. The 
contributions are directed to buy environmental education books for the local school.  
We differ from Jack and Recalde (2015) in the choice of the public good. In fact, in our case it 
is not exogenously decided by the experimenter, but is left to the group’s decision. This guarantees 
that the chosen public good reflects more genuinely the group preferences of what the group needs for 
its activity. We use various procedures to let each group decide their own public good: either the 
leader or the group decides, and in the latter case by means of public discussion or with private 
voting. So far we are not aware of any evidence in the experimental domain giving such a choice. 
Nonetheless, experimental evidence on other collective decisions in groups of different size shows 
that, when groups are large, taking decisions and solving conflicts without a leader but, for instance, 
through a public discussion might end up in confusion and ineffectiveness (Weber et al. 2001; 
Chaudhuri et al. 2009).  
The paper is also related to the scarce literature on “participatory incentives” that we introduce 
in the second treatment. This is a form of enforcement based on the involvement of local population, 
for instance through rewards that the community receives only if its members demonstrate to each 
other their willingness to participate and cooperate. A theoretical study is from Breier and Visser 
(2006), who show that, in a community-based provision of development services, individuals’ 
contribution is feasible only when the subjects expect a sufficiently high proportion of other 
beneficiaries to contribute. An example of participatory incentives is provided by South Africa’s 
Mvula Trust. This NGO has promoted the “emergency fund” rule, such that the project 
implementation is conditional on the community financial commitment for a minimum specific 
percentage of the project’s capital costs. According to Palmer (1998) the rule represents an effective 
mobilization tool for the community and it also serves as savings to insurance against future 
breakdowns. We provide the first experimental evidence on participatory incentives. 
Finally, the paper investigates the interaction between leadership and incentives. In this vein, 
it is related to Gutiérrez, Hilborn and Defeo (2011), who highlight the role of leadership in enhancing 
the effectiveness of incentives in a field experiment on the management of a common resource. They 
show that an accountable and legitimate community leader plays a prominent role in making 
incentives work, to the extent that he influences users’ compliance, enhances conflict resolutions and 
gives resilience to changes in governance. Similarly, Esman and Uphoff (1984) find that leaders in 
rural communities drive to a more efficient coordination by elucidating incentives, constraints and 
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enforcement mechanisms. Differently from these studies, we find that participatory incentives are so 
effective in enhancing cooperation that the difference between the leader’s and the other members’ 
contributions vanishes when we introduce those incentives.  
 
3.  The field: Langa, Philippi and Khayelitsha townships 
The lab-in-the-field experiment was conducted in three townships in the Cape Town area. 
Analyzing townships today, more than two decades after the end of Apartheid, is still a worthwhile 
exercise. In fact, even before Apartheid was formally introduced in 1948, racial discrimination led to 
physically separating the life of white colonists from their non-white servants (Black Afrikaans or 
slaves deported from other colonies).3 Physical separation was particularly severe in Cape Town, 
which  “[…] was conceived with a white-only center, surrounded by contained settlements for the 
black and colored labor forces to the East, each hemmed in by highways and rail lines, rivers and 
valleys, and separated from the affluent white suburbs by protective buffer zones of scrubland” 
(Wainwright 20144).5 This separation remained even after the abolition of Apartheid, and according to 
some it was made even worse by unequal and controversial policies adopted by the government 
(Mattes 2002; Seeking 2007). Nowadays, the unresolved problem of housing segregation is still a 
great concern in South Africa as it creates significant social and political tensions.  
The three townships we consider (Langa, Philippi and Khayelitsha) are extremely 
homogeneous for ethnic composition, income distribution and educational attainment. With very few 
exceptions, all inhabitants are Black African and belong to the Xhosa ethnic group. According to the 
latest official data, about 35% of the population have completed high school and 75% have a monthly 
income of 3,200 rands or less, corresponding to U.S.$960  P.P.P. 2014 (census data).6 More details 
about each of the three townships are given in Appendix A. 
In general these townships are overcrowded slums, where dwellers live very close to each 
other, interact continuously and share several moments in their everyday life. According to some 
township residents the strong sense of community is a natural consequence of the Apartheid period, in 
that “[…] has managed to bring us together. Although it wasn’t a good idea, it has brought us together 
                                                          
3 The townships were initially built as dormitory towns, isolated from the nearby city, to host colored or black servants. 
4 http://www.theguardian.com/cities/2014/apr/30/cape-town-apartheid-ended-still-paradise-few-south-africa. 
5 The physical legacy of a plan designed to separate poor blacks from rich whites is still carved into Cape Town urban 
form, so that townships’ dwellers face not the problems of high unemployment and bad quality of housing, but also 
dependency from the nearby city, where all the economic activities are located.  
6 Data are taken from the 2011 City of Cape Town Suburbs Census. The data from the Census on income and education 
levels are available only for official residents. 
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in such a way that now we are able to pursue or to do our traditions and customs because we know 
one another” (Sabu Siyaka, resident in Langa).7 
This makes these townships an ideal environment to investigate the mechanisms promoting 
cohesion and cooperation among segregated people. Indeed, in lab experiments Rand et al. (2009) 
find that repeated interactions have future consequences for everyday life; since the identities of 
virtuous and non-virtuous people are usually known, social control among naturally existing 
communities’ members is strong and reputation is often at stake.8 In these environments high rates of 
cooperation are a likely outcome because of stronger efficiency in monitoring peers’ behavior and in 
the use of sanction and rewards, especially if non-monetary (e.g. Houser et al. 2008). 
 
4.  The experiment   
The experiment consists of a one-shot, simultaneous, pen-and-paper game employing a 
Voluntary Contribution Mechanism. Ten experimental sessions were conducted between July 27 and 
August 11 2015, with two treatments of five sessions each. In the month before the experiment, we 
recruited about 300 participants belonging to 10 different existing groups active in the three 
townships: 269 showed up. Group size ranged from 17 to 34 people. The subjects of each group 
shared mutual interests and activities: for instance, mothers engaged in HIV prevention, youth 
involved in social activities, sports team supporters, social workers and ward residents. Groups’ 
characteristics (mission, composition, frequency of activity, degree of cohesion, etc.) are summarized 
in Table 1. 
  
                                                          
7 See http://mapping.wm.edu/2014/01/04/post-apartheid-identity-in-cape-town-townships. 
8 See also Monge et al. (1985) on the effects of high levels of physical proximity on social control. 
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Table 1: Groups’ characteristics 
Session Group name 
Location of 
activities 
Mission 
Frequency 
of group 
meetings 
Leadership  
and cohesion 
Public good 
selected (to be 
bought with the 
money collected 
by the group) 
1 
Ikamva Peace 
Marker 
Philippi, 
Samora 
Machel, 
Kosovo and 
Sweet Home  
Neighborhood 
watching (especially 
children when 
entering/exiting from 
school) 
Monthly, the 
group has 
everyday 
activities 
Diffuse leadership, very 
cohesive group 
Flashlights 
2 
Tsoga Centre 
Volunteers 
Samora 
Machel 
Social workers, youth 
group employed with 
grant from the Youth 
National Agency to do 
social activities from 
the community  
Monthly, the 
group has 
everyday 
activities 
Group members are selected 
by public call and get access 
to a subsidy to work for the 
community. Members 
change frequently. The 
leader is in charge of 
coordination and is not 
chosen by the group. 
Kitchen soup 
3 
Iqhayiya FM 
Radio Station 
Samora 
Machel 
Community radio 
Monthly, the 
group has 
everyday 
activities 
Diffuse leadership, very 
cohesive group 
Rent payment for 
the radio site 
4 
Khanyisa Youth 
Development 
Samora 
Machel 
Awareness and 
education activities in 
the community 
Monthly Diffuse (weak) leadership 
T-shirts with the 
group logo 
5 
Orlando Pirates 
Samora Machel 
Branch 
Samora 
Machel 
Orlando football team 
supporteres 
Monthly, 
depends on 
football 
matches 
Diffuse leadership, very 
cohesive group 
Supporters' trip to 
Johannesburg 
6 
Inyanda Youth 
Network 
Philippi 
Youth Network 
supporting young 
artists (music, dance, 
theater, etc.) 
Monthly 
Diffuse leadership. 
Difficulty in finding a 
permanent setup. 
Office stationery 
7 
Women's 
Network  
Various 
townships in 
Cape Town 
Area 
HIV prevention  Monthly Diffuse leadership 
Seeds for the 
group's vegetable 
garden 
8 
EMBO Langa 
initiation site  
Langa 
Management of 
initiation site  
Every 3 
Months 
Diffuse leadership, roles are 
pre-determined by 
traditional leaders or 
institutions representatives. 
No election by the group.  
Facilities for the 
initiation 
ceremony 
9 
Masibambisane 
Youth Education 
Khayelitsa 
Use drama as education 
tool 
Every week Diffuse leadership Container 
10 
Representatives 
of Ward 53 
Langa 
Local committee of 
house owners 
Monthly 
Diffuse leadership, non 
cohesive group 
Facilities for the 
common room 
 
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
 
Arrangements for the timing and location for the experimental sessions were made through 
group leaders. Each group’s leader presented himself or herself as the “chairperson” of the group 
while giving a brief presentation of the group history and activities before the session started. This 
made him or her easily identifiable by the experimenters. 
8 
 
Each group took part in one session only and was randomly assigned to one of our two 
treatments. Before the experiment, the instructions, the surveys and the games material were 
translated into local language (Xhosa) by three of the facilitators. 
 
4.1.  Experimental design  
Participants were welcomed, assigned an identification number on a random basis and took a 
seat in the room. The experimenter read aloud the instructions in English. One facilitator repeated 
them in the local language, Xhosa. When necessary, the same mechanism was used to answer 
clarification questions publicly and in private.9 
Before the beginning of their active participation in the experiment, subjects were asked to 
sign a consent form, which clarified that all submitted decisions were anonymous and that the 
experimenters were not able to associate their name with the identification number that was reported 
in the questionnaires and in any decision sheet. Communication among participants during the 
experiment was strictly forbidden. 
In both treatments the experiment consisted of two phases. In Phase 1 subjects earned 50 
rands by answering two questionnaires. Questionnaire A contained standard socio-demographic 
questions on gender, age, job, education level, family composition and type of dwelling. After a short 
break, during which subjects were offered coffee and biscuits, they received Questionnaire B, focused 
on their relationship within the group and their attitudes towards trust and values.10 By completing 
both questionnaires, they earned 50 South African rands (corresponding roughly to U.S.$15, 2014 
P.P.P). 
In Phase 2 subjects had to decide the destination of the money they had earned in Phase 1 by 
determining how many rands they wanted to keep for themselves and how many rands they wanted to 
donate to the group. Specifically, let I ={1, 2, . . ., n} denote a group of n subjects who interact in a 
one-shot, simultaneous public goods game. Individual i ∈ I receives the endowment e of 50 rands, 
which can be allocated either to a private good or to a public good. The voluntary contribution of 
individual i (ci) to the public good must satisfy 0 ≤ ci ≤ e. Therefore, the payoff of member i in group 
g, labeled 𝜋𝑖,𝑔, is determined according to the following equation: 
 
𝜋𝑖,𝑔 = 𝑒 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑔 + 𝛾𝑖,𝑔 ∑ 𝑐𝑗,𝑔
𝑛
𝑗=1      (1) 
 
                                                          
9  For details about the instructions, see Appendix B. 
10 For details about the questionnaires, see Appendix C. 
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where the group size n varies across groups and the endowment e is fixed 50 rands. The parameter 
𝛾𝑖,𝑔 denotes the Marginal Per Capita Return (MPCR) from investing in the public good. Note that in 
standard public good games there is an equal split of the public account among group members, so 
that 𝛾 is equal for all subjects (𝛾 =
1
𝑛
). In addition, it is chosen in order to satisfy 0 < 𝛾 < 1 < 𝑛𝛾, 
which means that there is a conflict between the self-interested choice and the socially optimal one: 
subjects face a social dilemma. Differently, in our experiment the public good is specific to each 
group and subjects are potentially heterogeneous for what concerns the private returns from the public 
good and the opportunity cost of contributing to it. Then, the MPCR 𝛾 is subject and group specific.11 
The public goods the groups chose to buy with the money collected are summarized in the last 
column of Table 1. 
After deciding how much to donate, subjects were asked to make guesses about their peers’ 
behavior. Belief elicitation was incentivized: subjects won h rands for the number of correct guesses 
b (out of the B guesses they have to make). Taking into account the monetary consequences of the 
correct guesses yields the following payoff function for a group member i: 
 
𝜋𝑖,𝑔 = 𝑒 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑔 + 𝛾𝑖,𝑔 ∑ 𝑐𝑖,𝑔
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ℎ𝑏𝑖,𝑔     (2) 
 
where h corresponds to 10 rands.  
The decision process differs across two alternative treatments, described in detail below. 
Before proceeding to final payments, the experimenter read aloud the amount contributed by the 
group in a way that the specific contribution of each member was not made recognizable. The 
experimenter publicly gave an envelope containing the money to the leader of the group. Then, 
private payments in opaque envelopes were carried out after calling subjects one at time.  
 
4.2.  Treatments 
The experimental setting calls for two different treatments. In Treatment 1, participants 
received a sheet containing detailed instructions of this phase and they had to decide how many of the 
50 rands earned in Phase 1 they wanted to keep for themselves and how many they wanted to 
contribute to a public account to buy the public good.  
Participants had to make a choice on their contribution levels in four conditions. The fund 
destination was decided by: (a) the community leader; (b) a public discussion; (c) private voting, with 
                                                          
11
 Isaac and Walker (1988) find that subjects' contributions to public goods increase in their own marginal return from 
contributions (that is, a subject contributes more the lower the opportunity cost of contribution). Glöckner et al. (2011) 
show that, when one subject has a stronger incentive to contribute than the others, other participants are more cooperative. 
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“one head one vote” (e.g. each vote had the same weight); (d) private voting, with each vote being 
weighted according to the subject’s contribution. 
After the participants’ choices were made, only one of these situations, randomly selected by 
rolling a dice, was actually implemented; the order of the four situations was randomized across 
sessions. To assure anonymity, participants wrote their contributions choices in the sheet and 
immediately gave it to the experimenter or to one of the facilitators. Moreover, they were asked to 
guess the average contribution of peers in each situation: if they were correct, they won additional h 
rands for each correct guess. The feedback on the correct answers was given at the end of the 
experiment. 
In Treatment 2, participants received a sheet containing detailed instructions and had to decide 
how many of the e rands earned in Phase 1 they wanted to keep for themselves and how many they 
wanted to contribute to a public account to buy the public good. In this treatment, it was decided by 
the leader, as in Condition (a) of Treatment 1. The main feature here is that participatory incentives 
took the form of a jackpot that was assigned by the experimenter if the total amount of contributions 
was at least equal to a given threshold. The threshold is a sum of rands proportional to the number of 
group members.12 That is, t rands times the number of members n, where we set t equal to 20. 
Moreover, participants had to make a choice on their contribution levels in two conditions. In 
the first, the whole group received a “jackpot”, that is equal to p rands times the number of members. 
We set p equal to 50. For example, in a group of 30 members, the threshold is 600 rands; if the overall 
contributions were greater or equal to this sum, then the group won an additional 1,500 rands. In the 
second condition, each participant received a fraction of the jackpot (“individual jackpot”), equal to p 
rands. So, in the example above, each participant might win an additional 50 rands if the total amount 
of contributions reached at least a threshold of 600 rands. 
Only one of these conditions, randomly selected, was actually implemented; the order of the 
two conditions was randomized across sessions. To assure anonymity, participants wrote their 
contributions choices in the sheet and immediately gave them to the experimenter or to one of the 
facilitators. As in Treatment 1, the participants were asked to guess the average contribution of their 
peers in both conditions: for every correct guess, they won an additional 10 rands; the feedback on 
the correctness of their answer was given at the end of the experiment. 
  
                                                          
12
 This is to make comparisons across groups of different size. 
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In formulas, the individual payoff in the “collective jackpot” condition is: 
 
𝜋𝑖,𝑔 = 𝑒 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑔 + 𝛾𝑖,𝑔(∑ 𝑐𝑖,𝑔
𝑛
𝑖=1 + 𝑛𝑝) + ℎ𝑏𝑖,𝑔       if   ∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  ≥ 𝑡𝑛     (3) 
𝜋𝑖,𝑔 = 𝑒 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑔 + 𝛾𝑖,𝑔 ∑ 𝑐𝑖,𝑔
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ℎ𝑏𝑖,𝑔         if   ∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 < 𝑡𝑛 
 
In the “individual jackpot” condition, the payoff is: 
𝜋𝑖,𝑔 = 𝑒 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑔 + 𝛾𝑖,𝑔 ∑ 𝑐𝑖,𝑔
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ℎ𝑏𝑖,𝑔 + 𝑝        if   ∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1  ≥ 𝑡𝑛     (4) 
𝜋𝑖,𝑔 = 𝑒 − 𝑐𝑖,𝑔 + 𝛾𝑖,𝑔 ∑ 𝑐𝑖,𝑔
𝑛
𝑖=1 + ℎ𝑏𝑖,𝑔     if   ∑ 𝑐𝑗
𝑛
𝑗=1 < 𝑡𝑛 
 
Note that the participant is indifferent between the payoffs deriving from the two conditions 
only if 𝛾𝑖 =
1
𝑛
, which means that group members split equally the returns of the public good as in 
standard public good games. 
 
4.3.  Procedures 
The experiments were run in four different locations: the Tsoga Centre in Samora Machell 
(Philippi), the Beautiful Gate (Philippi), a common room used by residents of Ward 53 at Langa and a 
container in Khayelitsha. There were 10 sessions, with a total of 269 participants, divided as 
summarized in Table 2. 
Table 2: Distribution of subjects in the 10 sessions (group size) 
Session 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Size 29 27 19 21 32 17 27 33 34 29 
Heterogeneity index 
(1)
 0.0555 0.0511 0.0716 0.0683 0.0412 0.0843 0.0485 0.0422 0.0417 0.0458 
(1): The heterogeneity index is the Herfindahl index of a categorical variable reflecting within-group differences in the socio-demographic 
characteristics. Higher values correspond to higher heterogeneity. 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text. 
 
There were 129 people participating in Treatment 1 (sessions 1 to 5) and 140 in Treatment 2 
(sessions 6 to 10). We employed a between-subjects design: no individual participated in more than 
one session. 
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5.  Results 
In this section we first present the main characteristics of the sample; then, we analyze the 
data using both non-parametric tests and empirical estimation procedures. 
 
5.1.  Main characteristics of the sample 
All subjects in our sample belong to the Xhosa ethnic group (Black African). The gender 
distribution is fairly balanced having about 47% of women. Participants are heterogeneous for their 
age, ranging from 18 to 72 and an average age of 36. About one-third (36%) of the population (aged 
20 years and older) has completed at least Grade 12 (high-school). The unemployment rate among 
working-age people (aged between 18 and 64) is quite high (56%) and symmetrically household 
income is quite low: 75% of the people live in households with a reported monthly income lower than 
2,000 South African rands (roughly corresponding to U.S.$600  P.P.P. 2014) or less (see Table 3).  
Table 3: Summary statistics of the experimental subject pool 
Description Variable Obs Mean Std Dev Min Max 
Socio – demographic 
Age Age 257 35.6 12.8 18 72 
Age squared Age2 257 1,430.2 1,043.4 324 5,184 
Female Female 262 0.473 0.5 0 1 
High educational level  High_edu 269 0.123 0.329 0 1 
No formal earning No_wage 269 0.227 0.419 0 1 
Poor housing conditions Poorhousing 269 0.636 0.482 0 1 
Involvement in the community 
Sense of neighborhood  Sense of neighborhood 269 2.974 1.157 0 4 
Community involvement Sense of community 269 2.520 1.091 0 4 
Time spent in the community Time spent in community 269 2.756 1.445 0 4 
Daily involvement in community's activities Everyday in community 269 0.665 0.473 0 1 
Community like a family Community like a family 269 0.234 0.424 0 1 
Closest neighbors like a family Closest neighbors as family 269 0.472 0.5 0 1 
Values 
Trust in other people Trust 269 0.297 0.458 0 1 
Importance of determination Determination 269 0.301 0.459 0 1 
Importance of hardwork Hardwork 269 0.543 0.499 0 1 
Importance of responsibility Responsibility 269 0.245 0.431 0 1 
Importance of saving Saving 269 0.227 0.419 0 1 
Importance of unselfishness Unselfishness 269 0.212 0.409 0 1 
Group Features 
Low cohesion Low cohesion 10 0.301 0.459 0 1 
Group with altruistic mission Altruistic 10 0.400 0.516 0 1 
Group size Group size 10 26.9 6.045 17 34 
Group with daily activities Everyday meetings 10 0.400 0.516 0 1 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text. 
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Low income translates into very poor housing conditions: 60% of the people live in informal 
dwellings (shacks). Whereas 81% have access to piped water in their dwelling or inside their yard, 
only 42% have access to a flush toilet connected to the public sewer system. Almost 88% use 
electricity for lighting in their dwelling. 
 Since there is evidence that heterogeneity within group members might increase cooperation 
(e.g. Weber 2004; Reuben and Riedl 2011; Dasgupta and Hakim Orman 2013; Collins 2015), we have 
built a group heterogeneity measure of the previous socio-demographic variables. The Herfindahl-
Hirschman index of this heterogeneity shows that each of the ten groups is quite homogeneous (Table 
2). 
With regard to answers to behavior and community life, it is not uncommon for community 
members to ask or give advice to their peers: community life becomes then a part of everyday 
activities, as asserted by 50.4% of participants. Despite all of this, we find a strong tendency (about 
70%) to distrust other people and to be very careful when approaching them.13 Since this measure can 
capture also individual trustworthiness, and not just the belief that others can be trusted (Glaeser et al. 
2000), we also ask them which qualities they believe children should learn at home. The traits 
recognized as most valuable by the participants were good manners, hard work, tolerance and respect 
for others, determination and perseverance, whereas obedience and imagination appeared to be at the 
bottom of the participants’ priorities.14 
 
5.2.  Contribution levels 
Table 4 summarizes the average contribution levels in Treatment 1 in the four conditions 
differing in the way the public good is selected. 
  
                                                          
13 To measure trust we consider the following question (question 5.8 in Questionnaire B): “Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?”. This question is widely 
used by economists. Sapienza, Toldra and Zingales (2007) counted more than 500 papers. 
14 For a discussion on this point see also Tabellini (2010). 
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Table 4: Average contribution levels in Treatment 1 
Statistics 
(a) Leader’s  
decision 
(b) Public  
discussion 
(c) Voting  
(one head one vote) 
(d) Voting  
(weighted on contribution) 
Average 14.55 8.26 8.70 7.94 
Standard error 1.67 1.35 1.42 1.30 
Min 0 0 0 0 
Max 50 50 50 50 
Obs 129 129 129 129 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text. 
 
Participants contribute significantly more when the leader is required to take the decision on  
the public good (condition (a)) than in the other three conditions: the average level of contribution is 
14.55, rather than 8.26 (condition (b), public discussion), 8.70 (condition (c), voting with one head 
one vote), 7.94 (condition (d), voting weighted for contribution levels). Using one-sample t tests, we 
find that the differences are statistically significant; respectively: t = 4.394 (p = 0.000), t = 3.844 (p = 
0.000), t = 4.616 (p = 0.000).15  
Moreover, there is no significant difference between the contribution levels when the public 
good is selected via public discussion rather than via both types of voting procedures (t = -0.919, p = 
0.359 and t = 0.497, p = 0.620, respectively, one-sample t test), or between contribution levels when 
voting occurs per capita or it is weighted by the subject’s level of contribution (t = 1.271, p = 0.206, 
one-sample t test). 
Contribution levels in Treatment 2 are summarized in Table 5. 
  
                                                          
15 All statistical tests are two-tailed unless otherwise specified.  
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Table 5: Average contribution levels in Treatment 2 
Statistics Collective jackpot Individual jackpot 
Average 29.43 32.34 
Standard error 1.11 1.07 
Median 25 30 
Min 0 0 
Max 50 50 
Obs 140 140 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text. 
In this treatment, contribution levels significantly increase when the prize is individual rather 
than the case when the prize is awarded to the whole group. In the collective jackpot condition (that is, 
when the prize for reaching a pre-determined threshold is to the benefit of the whole group), the 
average contribution level is 29.43 rands; in the other condition (individual jackpot), the average is 
32.34. The difference is statistically significant (t = 4.122, p = 0.000, one-sample t test).  
Interestingly, we find that when a jackpot is awarded the contributions are significantly higher 
than in condition (a) of Treatment 1.16 In detail, the monetary incentive works either when collective 
(Z = -7.91, p = 0.000; Wilcoxon rank-sum test on individual averages) or when individual (Z = -8.56, 
p = 0.000).  
We also find a strong treatment effect in reducing the frequency of zero-level contributions: 
while in Treatment 1 their frequency ranged from 25% to 88%, in Treatment 2 they are almost 
inexistent (Figure 2).  
  
                                                          
16 Note that the three conditions (condition (a) of Treatment 1 and conditions with collective and individual jackpot in 
Treatment 2) are comparable because it is the leader who decides how to allocate the public fund. 
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Figure 2: Frequency of zero-level contributions in the ten sessions 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text. 
 
5.3.  Beliefs on peers’ behavior 
For each decision we measure subjects’ correctness of beliefs on peers’ contribution with the 
distance between the subject’s incentivized guess and the actual average contribution made by the 
group. Subjects are quite well-calibrated on predicting the group behavior: 63% of guesses are 
correct, whereas 25% of guesses underestimate the group’s contribution and 12% overestimate it. 
Beliefs are significantly higher in Treatment 2 (Wilcoxon rank-sum test on individual averages, with 
Z = -19.632, p = 0.000), but there are no differences in the correctness of beliefs across the two 
treatments (Wilcoxon rank-sum test on individual averages, with Z = 1.191, p = 0.233).  
The individuals who cooperate more are the ones who expect their peers to contribute more: 
we find a positive and significant correlation between a subject’s belief in the group contribution and 
his/her own contribution (Spearman correlation test, with coefficient = .760, p = 0.000). The 
correlation is stronger in Treatment 2 (Spearman correlation test, with coefficient = .506, p = 0.000 in 
Treatment 1, and coefficient = .737, p = 0.000 in Treatment 2, suggesting that participatory incentives 
entail not only beliefs of higher cooperation, but also higher subjects’ responsiveness to their 
expectation on peers’ behavior. We interpret this result as follows: the presence of a jackpot, either 
collective or individual, stimulates a collective effort for reaching at least the minimum cooperation 
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threshold for winning the prize. Since this goal needs members’ commitment, the individual decision 
is more sensitive to what members expect others to do. 
Interestingly, leaders are less optimistic than other members when predicting the group’s 
contribution behavior. They underestimate the group’s cooperation level significantly more than other 
subjects: the average distance between the leader’s belief and the group’s actual contribution is -6.66; 
the analogous distance for other subjects is -2.59. The difference between the two distances is 
statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank-sum test on individual averages, with Z = 2.859, p = 0.004).  
Finally, leaders’ contributions exhibit a very low correlation with their expectations on peers’ 
behavior (Spearman correlation test, with coefficient = .787, p = 0.098), suggesting they decide to 
cooperate even if they do not expect that the rest of the group will do so. 
 
5.4   Determinants of voluntary contribution 
In this sub-section we study the determinants of cooperative behavior considering individual 
and group related factors. Individual factors are subject specific; they are further categorized as socio-
demographic, involvement in the community (sense of neighborhood, time spent in the community, 
etc.) and values (trust in other people, importance of values to be transmitted to children, etc.). 
Specific features related to the group (group factors) consist of a set of features as described in 
Table 1: leadership style, degree of cohesion, group age, mission, meeting frequency, number of 
females. 
The empirical estimation is described by the following equation:  
 
            𝐶𝑖,𝑔 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑇 + 𝑋𝑖,𝑔 + 𝑉𝑖,𝑔 + 𝜃𝑍𝑔 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑔                                 (5)  
 
where 𝐶𝑖,𝑔 is the contribution in rands of individual i of group g. Our variable of interest (𝑇) is the 
Treatment dummy, assuming value zero for Treatment 1 and one for Treatment 2. 𝑋𝑖,𝑔 is matrix of 
individual socio-demographic controls. 𝑉𝑖,𝑔 are various measures of individual values, 𝑍𝑔 is matrix of 
group level features and 𝜀𝑖,𝑔 is the standard idiosyncratic error term. In all regressions we report 
estimated bootstrapped coefficients, clustered at group level. Basic descriptive statistics for the 
variable used in the econometric analysis are presented in Table 3. 
In the multivariable regression analyses we find that, irrespective of the chosen specification, 
the non-parametric evidence presented in the previous sub-section is confirmed. In Table 6 we report 
the estimated coefficients of the baseline model when the leader is required to take the decision on the 
public good in Treatment 1 (condition (a)) or in Treatment 2 in the presence of the collective jackpot. 
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Table 6: Determinants of contribution – individual characteristics (collective jackpot) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Age + 
Age^2 
Female High_edu No_wage Poorhousing 
All 
controls 
Leader interacted  
with Treatment 
Treatment 14.985* 14.670** 14.929** 15.539** 14.933** 15.447* 16.029** 
 
(7.831) (7.336) (7.380) (7.627) (7.159) (8.487) (7.936) 
Leader 14.583*** 14.975*** 13.999*** 14.453*** 14.579*** 13.834*** 21.515*** 
 
(2.774) (3.595) (3.837) (3.776) (4.051) (4.096) (5.760) 
Leader x Treatment 
      
-15.367** 
       
(6.941) 
Age 0.105 
    
0.273 0.241 
 
(0.558) 
    
(0.655) (0.601) 
Age2 0.000 
    
-0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.006) 
    
(0.007) (0.006) 
Female 
 
1.690 
   
1.941 2.044 
  
(3.387) 
   
(3.512) (2.819) 
High_edu 
  
3.008 
  
5.688 5.966 
   
(4.252) 
  
(3.567) (3.706) 
No_wage 
   
-4.036** 
 
-4.467** -4.238** 
    
(1.874) 
 
(2.130) (1.805) 
Poorhousing 
    
0.091 0.185 0.043 
     
(1.584) (1.732) (1.824) 
Constant 9.696 13.352** 13.635*** 14.585** 13.918** 5.128 5.408 
 
(12.764) (5.807) (4.703) (5.889) (5.789) (13.649) (11.302) 
Observations 257 262 269 269 269 253 253 
R-squared 0.220 0.194 0.203 0.209 0.200 0.238 0.245 
The table shows OLS regressions of the individual contribution level (dependent variable). Treatment is a dummy equal to 1 in Treatment 2 (0 in 
Treatment 1). Treatment 2 is limited to the case of collective jackpot. Age is the number of years since birth. Female is a dummy=1 for females. 
High_edu is a dummy=1 if the subject has completed high school. No_wage is a dummy=1 if the subject has no labor earnings. Poorhousing is a 
dummy=1 if the subject lives in a dwelling without electricity, or without toilet or in a single room. Bootstrapped standard errors, clustered at group 
level in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text. 
 
As usual, among socio–demographic variables we include individual age (Age) and its squared 
(Age2), a dummy equal to 1 for females (Female) and a dummy equal to 1 for individuals having 
completed at least secondary school education (High_edu). In addition, we introduce two controls of 
material deprivation that could affect the individual attitude to cooperate: an indicator for not having 
any regular source of income (No_wage) and a control for living in a very poor housing condition 
(i.e. a dwelling without electricity, or without a toilet, or with only one room; Poorhousing). 
In all the specifications the collective jackpot exerts a positive effect on the individual 
contributions to the public good. Individual age, gender and school attainment are not correlated with 
individual behavior. The contribution level decreases by about 4.2 rands for people having no official 
and regular earnings, as expected, and the effect is significant, while there is no relevant correlation 
between housing conditions and cooperation. We also try to investigate the role of the group leader by 
adding a dichotomous indicator for being the group leader, as previously defined. The leader 
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contributes significantly more than other group members, suggesting that he/she seems more 
unselfish and to act in the group’s interest. For example, considering column 6, our estimates indicate 
that the leader contributes 13.8 rands more than non-leader participants. In column 7 we interact the 
leader and the treatment dummies to investigate if there is complementarity or substitution between 
the two variables. The effect is negative and significant, meaning that the effect of being a leader 
matters in Treatment 1 and is weaker in Treatment 2, where contributions are mainly driven by 
monetary incentives.17 Finally, unreported estimates do not show any statistically significant 
correlation between group heterogeneity and contribution levels. 
In Table 6bis we repeat the same exercise of the previous table, but in Treatment 2 we 
consider the presence of the individual jackpot. All previous results are confirmed. Again, the jackpot 
exerts a positive effect on the individual contributions, but note that in this case the magnitude of the 
treatment variable (the estimated coefficient ranges from 17.6 to 19.2) is higher than in the previous 
table (from 14.7 to 16.0); this implies that having an individual incentive increases the contribution 
more, as already emphasized in the non-parametric tests shown in sub-section 5.2. Also the leader 
effect is positive and significant, but the coefficient is lower. Third, the interaction of the leader with 
the treatment variable is negative and significant as above.18 
  
                                                          
17
 The sum of the estimated parameters on the variables Leader and LeaderxTreatment is statistically different from zero 
only at 10% (p-value = 0.0867, 2 test). 
18
 The sum of the estimated parameters on the two variables Leader and LeaderxTreatment is not statistically different 
from zero (p-value = 0.7476, 2 test). 
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Table 6bis: Determinants of contribution – individual characteristics (individual jackpot) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Age + 
Age^2 
Female High_edu No_wage Poorhousing 
All 
controls 
Leader interacted  
with Treatment 
Treatment 17.899** 17.638** 17.825** 18.444*** 17.832** 18.415** 19.172** 
 
(8.419) (7.644) (7.824) (6.434) (7.254) (8.168) (7.958) 
Leader 11.723** 12.526*** 11.752** 11.904*** 12.030*** 11.272** 21.248*** 
 
(4.589) (4.562) (4.632) (3.714) (3.925) (5.130) (6.571) 
Leader x Treatment 
      
-19.960*** 
       
(7.192) 
Age 0.351 
    
0.530 0.489 
 
(0.622) 
    
(0.483) (0.600) 
Age2 -0.003 
    
-0.005 -0.004 
 
(0.006) 
    
(0.005) (0.006) 
Female 
 
2.126 
   
1.969 2.102 
  
(3.776) 
   
(3.309) (3.503) 
High_edu 
  
1.370 
  
3.601 3.961 
   
(3.344) 
  
(3.771) (2.963) 
No_wage 
   
-4.073** 
 
-4.732*** -4.435** 
    
(1.908) 
 
(1.640) (1.830) 
Poorhousing 
    
0.089 0.044 -0.140 
     
(1.701) (1.891) (1.495) 
Constant 5.291 13.229** 13.925*** 14.689*** 14.018** 1.080 1.445 
 
(13.729) (5.893) (5.087) (4.395) (6.097) (12.328) (14.116) 
Observations 257 262 269 269 269 253 253 
R-squared 0.277 0.248 0.254 0.262 0.254 0.291 0.302 
The table shows OLS regressions of the individual contribution level (dependent variable). Treatment is a dummy equal to 1 in Treatment 2 (0 in 
Treatment 1). Treatment 2 is limited to the case of individual jackpot. Age is the number of years since birth. Female is a dummy=1 for females. 
High_edu is a dummy=1 if the subject has completed high school. No_wage is a dummy=1 if the subject has no labor earnings. Poorhousing is a 
dummy=1 if the subject lives in a dwelling without electricity, or without toilet or in a single room. Bootstrapped standard errors, clustered at group 
level  in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text. 
  
Next, we test whether individual involvement in the local community explains the 
contribution levels. The impact of a greater involvement in the local community on the level 
contribution is not clear a priori. In fact, on the one hand, people who interact more with the local 
community might be less altruistic towards other communities (such as the experimental group) due 
to some “substitution” effect. On the other side, people with a deep involvement in community 
activities could also turn out to be those with strong pro-social attitudes. 
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Table 7: Determinants of contribution – involvement in the local community (collective jackpot) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Treatment 16.430** 16.017** 17.080** 16.090** 16.193** 15.930** 17.453** 18.052*** 
 
(7.389) (7.392) (7.149) (7.664) (7.861) (7.714) (6.954) (6.846] 
Leader 13.813*** 14.150*** 13.801*** 13.099*** 14.199*** 13.977*** 13.420*** 21.223*** 
 
(3.951) (4.239) (3.657) (3.690) (4.101) (4.573) (4.564) (6.904] 
Leader x Treatment        -15.674** 
        (7.792] 
Sense of neighborhood -1.946** 
      
 
 
(0.902) 
      
 
Closest neighbors as family 
 
-4.323** 
     
 
  
(1.722) 
     
 
Sense of community 
  
-2.343** 
    
 
   
(1.091) 
    
 
Community like a family 
   
-3.734** 
   
 
    
(1.748) 
   
 
Time in the community 
    
-0.991 
  
 
     
(1.484) 
  
 
Everyday in community 
     
4.746** 
 
 
      
(2.098) 
 
 
P Comp. 1 (community) 
      
-1.787*** -1.771*** 
       
(0.615) (0.624] 
P Comp. 2 (community) 
      
0.981 1.072 
       
(1.044) (1.007] 
Age 0.080 0.172 0.108 0.222 0.232 0.335 0.077 0.048 
 
(0.498) (0.679) (0.658) (0.571) (0.516) (0.515) (0.501) (0.490] 
Age2 0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.001 
 
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005] 
Female 1.922 2.153 1.656 1.833 1.446 2.371 1.716 1.829 
 
(2.858) (2.851) (3.251) (2.279) (2.914) (3.190) (2.788) (2.768] 
High_edu 5.853 5.462 5.880 5.379* 5.704 6.661** 5.728 6.024 
 
(3.829) (3.356) (3.937) (3.122) (3.905) (3.113) (4.217) (4.372] 
No_wage -4.106** -4.201** -4.413** -4.545** -4.277** -4.061** -4.216** -3.992** 
 
(1.821) (2.066) (1.765) (2.125) (1.760) (1.701) (1.969) (2.034] 
Poorhousing 0.186 0.183 0.841 0.432 0.709 0.017 0.808 0.664 
 
(1.373) (1.733) (1.411) (1.578) (1.665) (1.370) (1.251) (1.265] 
Constant 14.528 9.134 13.392 6.704 8.587 0.615 8.216 8.417 
 
(11.578) (14.528) (14.488) (12.411) (11.552) (12.755) (10.857) (10.670] 
Observations 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 
R-squared 0.252 0.252 0.256 0.246 0.243 0.253 0.264 0.271 
The table shows OLS regressions of the individual contribution level (dependent variable). Treatment is a dummy equal to 1 in Treatment 2 (0 in 
Treatment 1). Treatment 2 is limited to the case of collective jackpot. The variables Sense of neighborhood, Sense of community and Time in the 
community take integer values that range from 0 to 4 (higher values are ranked with higher scores). The variables Everyday in community, Community 
like a family and Closest neighbors as family are dummies. P Comp. 1/2 (community) are the principal components of the variables Sense of 
neighborhood, Closest neighbors as family, Sense of community, Community like a family, Time in the community and Everyday in community. Age is 
the number of years since birth. Female is a dummy=1 for females. High_edu is a dummy=1 if the subject has completed high school. No_wage is a 
dummy=1 if the subject has no labor earnings. Poorhousing is a dummy=1 if the subject lives in a dwelling without electricity, or without toilet or in a 
single room. Bootstrapped standard errors, clustered at group level  in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text. 
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The results (Table 7) show that our variables of interest (Treatment and Leader) are both 
significant and positive, as expected, thus confirming the validity of the baseline estimates. Moreover, 
the effects of the first four indicators on subjects’ attitude towards neighbors and the local community 
are negatively and significantly correlated with the contribution levels (columns 1 to 4). When 
considering subjects’ actual behavior, measured in terms of time spent in the community, the effect is 
still negative, but not significant (column 5). The sign is reversed and statistically different from zero 
only for those who have daily activities in the community (column 6). In columns 7 and 8 we repeat 
this exercise with the principal components of all these additional regressors: the estimates on our key 
variables are confirmed, the overall effect of the community involvement is negative and the effect of 
being a leader is weaker in Treatment 2. 
The results are confirmed with the individual jackpot in Treatment 2 (Table 7bis).  
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Table 7bis: Determinants of contribution – involvement in the local community (individual jackpot) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Treatment 19.525** 19.101** 20.132** 19.096** 18.804** 18.931** 20.540*** 21.316*** 
 
(7.774) (7.937) (8.209) (8.468) (9.060) (8.217) (7.619) (7.529] 
Leader 11.247** 11.651*** 11.236*** 10.494** 11.462** 11.423** 10.828** 20.941*** 
 
(4.386) (3.640) (3.839) (4.121) (5.281) (4.680) (4.685) (6.558] 
Leader x Treatment        -20.311*** 
        (7.697] 
Sense of neighborhood -2.194** 
      
 
 
(1.038) 
      
 
Closest neighbors as family 
 
-5.196*** 
     
 
  
(1.475) 
     
 
Sense of community 
  
-2.462** 
    
 
   
(1.113) 
    
 
Community like a family 
   
-3.951*** 
   
 
    
(1.501) 
   
 
Time in the community 
    
-0.517 
  
 
     
(1.631) 
  
 
Everyday in community 
     
5.057*** 
 
 
      
(1.789) 
 
 
P Comp. 1 (community) 
      
-1.889*** -1.869*** 
       
(0.572) (0.585] 
P Comp. 2 (community) 
      
1.052 1.170 
       
(0.799) (0.805] 
Age 0.313 0.409 0.357 0.476 0.509 0.597 0.323 0.286 
 
(0.613) (0.515) (0.503) (0.596) (0.635) (0.556) (0.613) (0.592] 
Age2 -0.002 -0.004 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 -0.006 -0.003 -0.002 
 
(0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006] 
Female 1.947 2.224 1.669 1.854 1.710 2.427 1.732 1.878 
 
(3.403) (3.388) (3.418) (3.444) (3.723) (3.116) (3.312) (3.281] 
High_edu 3.786 3.329 3.803 3.273 3.609 4.637 3.645 4.029 
 
(3.496) (2.875) (2.741) (3.148) (2.836) (3.109) (2.873) (3.150] 
No_wage -4.326** -4.413*** -4.676** -4.815** -4.633** -4.300*** -4.468* -4.177* 
 
(1.884) (1.531) (1.969) (1.897) (1.938) (1.467) (2.380) (2.347] 
Poorhousing 0.046 0.042 0.734 0.306 0.318 -0.135 0.704 0.518 
 
(1.345) (1.312) (1.647) (1.615) (1.538) (1.891) (1.323) (1.314] 
Constant 11.680 5.896 9.767 2.748 2.884 -3.729 4.337 4.597 
 
(15.032) (11.980) (10.345) (14.906) (12.205) (12.268) (14.764) (14.354] 
Observations 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 
R-squared 0.307 0.310 0.309 0.299 0.292 0.307 0.318 0.330 
The table shows OLS regressions of the individual contribution level (dependent variable). Treatment is a dummy equal to 1 in Treatment 2 (0 in 
Treatment 1). Treatment 2 is limited to the case of individual jackpot. The variables Sense of neighborhood, Sense of community and Time in the 
community take integer values that range from 0 to 4 (higher values are ranked with higher scores). The variables Everyday in community, Community 
like a family and Closest neighbors as family are dummies. P Comp. 1/2 (community) are the principal components of the variables Sense of 
neighborhood, Closest neighbors as family, Sense of community, Community like a family, Time in the community and Everyday in community. Age is 
the number of years since birth. Female is a dummy=1 for females. High_edu is a dummy=1 if the subject has completed high school. No_wage is a 
dummy=1 if the subject has no labor earnings. Poorhousing is a dummy=1 if the subject lives in a dwelling without electricity, or without toilet or in a 
single room. Bootstrapped standard errors, clustered at group level  in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text. 
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 We also explore the role of individual values and attitudes in shaping subjects’ behavior. In 
fact, Kocher, Martinsson and Visse (2012) find that significant differences in cooperation between 
blacks and whites disappear when adding measures of trust as controls. Then, we verify that our 
results hold also when the previous empirical specification is modified by adding the measures of 
trust as background controls for attitudes and behaviors (Table 8).19 
Table 8: Determinants of contribution – values and trust (collective jackpot) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Treatment 15.175** 15.215** 15.634** 15.519** 15.327** 15.375** 17.019** 17.618** 
 
[7.136] [7.010] [7.156] [7.041] [6.690] [7.062] [7.616] [7.458] 
Leader 14.175*** 12.998*** 13.752*** 13.908*** 13.957*** 13.794*** 14.018*** 21.848*** 
 
[4.515] [4.590] [4.424] [4.320] [4.283] [4.265] [4.719] [6.485] 
Leader x Treatment        -15.713** 
        [7.244] 
Trust -1.078 
     
-1.857 -1.879 
 
[3.130] 
     
[2.441] [2.537] 
Determination 
 
1.868 
     
 
  
[2.451] 
     
 
Hardwork 
  
-0.579 
    
 
   
[1.753] 
    
 
Responsibility 
   
-0.530 
   
 
    
[2.296] 
   
 
Saving 
    
0.843 
  
 
     
[2.125] 
  
 
Unselfishness 
     
0.446 
 
 
      
[2.073] 
 
 
P Comp. of values 
      
-1.859*** -1.843*** 
       
[0.579] [0.597] 
P Comp. 1 (community) 
      
0.944 1.035 
       
[1.027] [0.995] 
P Comp. 2 (community) 
      
0.035 0.030 
       
[0.695] [0.636] 
Constant 4.935 4.905 5.463 5.275 4.676 4.979 8.031 8.233 
 
[11.433] [11.513] [11.390] [11.418] [10.964] [11.592] [10.190] [10.042] 
Observations 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 
R-squared 0.239 0.240 0.238 0.238 0.239 0.238 0.266 0.273 
The table shows OLS regressions of the individual contribution level (dependent variable). Treatment is a dummy equal to 1 in Treatment 2 (0 in 
Treatment 1). Treatment 2 is limited to the case of collective jackpot. The variable Trust is a dummy =1 if the answer to question 5.8 is “Most people 
can be trusted.” Determination, Hardwork, Responsibility, Saving and Unselfishness are dummies =1 for the corresponding answers to question 5.9.  
P Comp. (values) is the principal component of the variables Determination, Hardwork, Responsibility, Saving and Unselfishness variables (question 
5.9). P Comp. 1/2 (community) are the principal components of the variables Sense of neighborhood, Closest neighbors as family, Sense of community, 
Community like a family, Time in the community and Everyday in community. The coefficients of the individual characteristics variables (Age, Age2, 
Female, High_edu, No_wage, Poorhousing) are not reported. Bootstrapped standard errors, clustered at group level in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text. 
 
                                                          
19 Specifically, the level of trust in other people and the qualities important in everyday life that must be transmitted to 
children from parents. 
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 First, note that the treatment and leader dummies maintain their significance over all the 
specifications. Moreover, we do not find any statistically significant correlation between the 
individual contributions and trust in other people (column 1). Similarly, no effect is found when 
considering alternative values that each subject believes to be important in everyday life and therefore 
must be taught to their children: determination, hard work, responsibility, saving and selfishness 
(columns 2 to 6). Finally, we consider trust, the principal component of values and also add the 
principal components of the involvement in the local community, introduced in Table 7. Our main 
results are confirmed also in this case (column 7). 
Our findings hold also when repeating these estimates with the individual jackpot (Table 
8bis). 
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Table 8bis: Determinants of contribution – values and trust (individual jackpot) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Treatment 18.301** 18.167*** 18.369** 18.441*** 18.491*** 18.298*** 20.200*** 20.976*** 
 
[7.119] [7.005] [7.134] [7.007] [6.825] [6.968] [7.757] [7.566] 
Leader 11.415** 10.377** 11.292** 11.297** 11.193** 11.205** 11.229** 21.362*** 
 
[4.749] [4.539] [4.661] [4.440] [4.453] [4.408] [4.914] [6.129] 
Leader x Treatment        -20.336*** 
        [6.451] 
Trust -0.453 
     
-1.230 -1.258 
 
[3.290] 
     
[2.640] [2.815] 
Determination 
 
1.999 
     
 
  
[2.740] 
     
 
Hardwork 
  
0.143 
    
 
   
[2.335] 
    
 
Responsibility 
   
-0.186 
   
 
    
[2.290] 
   
 
Saving 
    
-0.539 
  
 
     
[2.197] 
  
 
Unselfishness 
     
0.728 
 
 
      
[1.867] 
 
 
P Comp. (values) 
      
0.088 0.082 
       
[0.782] [0.728] 
P Comp. 1 (community) 
      
-1.939*** -1.919*** 
       
[0.533] [0.554] 
P Comp. 2 (community) 
      
1.030 1.148 
       
[1.072] [1.053] 
Constant 0.999 0.842 0.998 1.132 1.369 0.836 4.180 4.441 
 
[11.429] [11.688] [11.945] [11.466] [11.067] [11.471] [10.023] [10.015] 
Observations 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 
R-squared 0.291 0.293 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.291 0.319 0.331 
The table shows OLS regressions of the individual contribution level (dependent variable). Treatment is a dummy equal to 1 in Treatment 2 (0 in 
Treatment 1). Treatment 2 is limited to the case of individual jackpot. The variable Trust is a dummy =1 if the answer to question 5.8 is “Most people 
can be trusted.” Determination, Hardwork, Responsibility, Saving and Unselfishness are dummies =1 for the corresponding answers to question 5.9.   
P Comp. (values) is the principal component of the variables Determination, Hardwork, Responsibility, Saving and Unselfishness variables (question 
5.9). P Comp. 1/2 (community) are the principal components of the variables Sense of neighborhood, Closest neighbors as family, Sense of community, 
Community like a family, Time in the community and Everyday in community. The coefficients of the individual characteristics variables (Age, Age2, 
Female, High_edu, No_wage, Poorhousing) are not reported. Bootstrapped standard errors, clustered at group level in brackets: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, 
* p<0.1. 
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text. 
 
 In the next step, we focus on group features as key determinants for average contribution 
level. In particular, we classify the ten groups according to the size, the level of internal cohesion, the 
mission (altruistic vs. non altruistic), and the frequency of the activities and meetings. Results are 
presented in Table 9.  
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Table 9: Determinants of contribution – group characteristics (collective jackpot) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Treatment 5.665** 15.966* 22.337*** 14.127* 21.102*** 24.382*** 24.910*** 
 
[1.849] [8.802] [6.843] [7.819] [3.148] [6.924] [6.763] 
Leader 14.836*** 15.235*** 13.187*** 13.638*** 15.201*** 14.241*** 21.492*** 
 
[4.499] [4.582] [4.770] [4.782] [4.110] [4.611] [6.771] 
Leader x Treatment 
      
-14.553* 
       
[7.476] 
Group size 
 
0.488 
     
  
[0.756] 
     
Low cohesion 
  
-18.879*** 
    
   
[4.520] 
    
Altruistic 
   
7.024 
   
    
[6.560] 
   
Everyday meetings 
    
19.934*** 
  
     
[3.505] 
  
P Comp. (group characteristics) 
     
-6.166 -6.143 
      
[3.918] [3.880] 
Trust -2.148 -2.598 -0.647 -2.426 -2.260 -0.799 -0.823 
 
[1.970] [2.683] [2.560] [2.349] [1.460] [2.351] [2.476] 
P Comp. (values) 0.167 -0.128 -0.559 0.546 0.350 -0.699 -0.701 
 
[0.513] [0.765] [0.506] [0.606] [0.479] [0.590] [0.536] 
P Comp. 1 (community) -0.541 -1.953*** -2.283*** -1.047* -0.369 -2.229*** -2.214*** 
 
[0.466] [0.672] [0.617] [0.611] [0.463] [0.495] [0.513] 
P Comp. 2 (community) 0.229 0.959 0.462 1.293 -0.321 -0.104 -0.016 
 
[0.758] [1.048] [0.662] [0.971] [0.800] [0.771] [0.746] 
Constant 7.248 -2.342 21.846** 1.807 -9.398** 4.761 4.960 
 
[6.023] [12.411] [9.446] [9.515] [4.324] [8.767] [8.698] 
Session FE Yes No No No No No No 
Observations 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 
R-squared 0.562 0.284 0.349 0.294 0.510 0.403 0.409 
The table shows OLS regressions of the individual contribution level (dependent variable). Treatment is a dummy equal to 1 in Treatment 2 (0 in 
Treatment 1). Treatment 2 is limited to the case of collective jackpot. Group size is the number of group members. Low cohesion is a dummy =1 for 
non-cohesive groups. Altruistic is a dummy for groups with pro-social mission. Everyday meetings is a dummy =1 if the group meets on a daily basis. 
The variable Trust is a dummy =1 if the answer to question 5.8 is “Most people can be trusted.” P Comp. (group characteristics) is the principal 
component of Group size, Low cohesion, Altruistic and Everyday meetings. P Comp. (values) is the principal component of the variables 
Determination, Hardwork, Responsibility, Saving and Unselfishness variables (question 5.9). P Comp. 1/2 (community) are the principal components of 
the variables Sense of neighborhood, Closest neighbors as family, Sense of community, Community like a family, Time in the community and Everyday 
in community. The coefficients of the individual characteristics variables (Age, Age2, Female, High_edu, No_wage, Poorhousing) are not reported. 
Standard errors are clustered at group level in Columns 1 and 6 (in brackets). In the other columns standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered at 
group level (in brackets): *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text. 
 
In Table 9, not only the effects of treatment and leader are still in place, but also some group 
features matter significantly for shaping individual behavior. In particular, in column 1 we run the 
regression adding group fixed effects. In the other columns, where we replace the fixed effects with 
group characteristics, we find that the subjects’ contribution level decreases in groups with low 
internal cohesion (column 3) and increases for groups with daily activities (columns 5). In columns 6 
and 7 we report the regressions with the group characteristics summarized by the principal 
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components, and the previous results are confirmed. Finally, we repeat the estimates in the presence 
of the individual jackpot and we obtain the same results (Table 9bis). 
Table 9bis: Determinants of contribution – group characteristics (individual jackpot) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Treatment 6.162*** 19.515** 25.559*** 16.740* 23.996*** 27.011*** 27.710*** 
 
[1.624] [8.678] [7.016] [8.653] [4.049] [8.252] [8.068] 
Leader 11.621* 12.020** 10.391** 10.774** 12.328*** 11.434** 21.033*** 
 
[5.225] [4.788] [5.061] [4.978] [4.405] [4.860] [6.447] 
Leader x Treatment 
      
-19.264*** 
       
[6.625] 
Group size 
 
0.317 
     
  
[0.693] 
     
Low cohesion 
  
-19.022*** 
    
   
[4.412] 
    
Altruistic 
   
8.405 
   
    
[6.652] 
   
Everyday meetings 
    
18.532*** 
  
     
[3.316] 
  
P Comp. (group characteristics) 
     
-5.703 -5.673 
      
[4.089] [4.087] 
Trust -1.396 -1.712 -0.011 -1.910 -1.604 -0.251 -0.283 
 
[2.106] [2.980] [2.839] [2.630] [1.670] [2.544] [2.754] 
P Comp. (values) 0.186 -0.018 -0.510 0.700 0.381 -0.590 -0.593 
 
[0.412] [0.844] [0.560] [0.626] [0.601] [0.686] [0.624] 
P Comp. 1 (community) -0.655 -2.001*** -2.367*** -0.968 -0.555 -2.282*** -2.262*** 
 
[0.394] [0.610] [0.571] [0.613] [0.428] [0.467] [0.487] 
P Comp. 2 (community) 0.655 1.040 0.544 1.447 -0.146 0.061 0.178 
 
[0.817] [1.094] [0.682] [0.924] [0.901] [0.796] [0.788] 
Constant 5.338 -2.570 18.099* -3.268 -12.024* 1.155 1.418 
 
[6.240] [10.329] [10.191] [9.403] [6.207] [9.999] [10.072] 
Session FE 253 253 253 253 253 253 253 
Observations 0.595 0.326 0.399 0.357 0.518 0.430 0.440 
R-squared 6.162*** 19.515** 25.559*** 16.740* 23.996*** 27.011*** 27.710*** 
The table shows OLS regressions of the individual contribution level (dependent variable). Treatment is a dummy equal to 1 in Treatment 2 (0 in 
Treatment 1). Treatment 2 is limited to the case of individual jackpot. Group size is the number of group members. Low cohesion is a dummy =1 for 
non-cohesive groups. Altruistic is a dummy for groups with pro-social mission. Everyday meetings is a dummy =1 if the group meets on a daily basis. 
The variable Trust is a dummy =1 if the answer to question 5.8 is “Most people can be trusted.” P Comp. (group characteristics) is the principal 
component of Group size, Low cohesion, Altruistic and Everyday meetings. P Comp. (values) is the principal component of the variables 
Determination, Hardwork, Responsibility, Saving and Unselfishness variables (question 5.9). P Comp. 1/2 (community) are the principal components of 
the variables Sense of neighborhood, Closest neighbors as family, Sense of community, Community like a family, Time in the community and Everyday 
in community. The coefficients of the individual characteristics variables (Age, Age2, Female, High_edu, No_wage, Poorhousing) are not reported. 
Standard errors are clustered at group level in Columns 1 and 6 (in brackets). In the other columns standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered at 
group level (in brackets): *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
 
Source: Authors’ analysis based on data described in the text. 
  
6.  Discussion and conclusions 
This work aims at shedding a light on collective-action problems among segregated 
communities. We run a lab-in-the-field experiment in three South African townships of Cape Town 
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(Langa, Philippi and Khayelitsha). The townships were first created during the Apartheid era for the 
specific purpose of separating black Africans’ housing from the rest of the city (lived in by whites). 
Despite the complete abolition of formal rules of segregation in 1994, nowadays a vast majority of 
poor black people still live in the townships, creating an ideal environment to study de facto 
residential segregation. 
Our experiment tests the cooperative attitude of naturally existing groups where members 
have to decide how much to donate to their group out of an endowment they earn for completing a 
questionnaire. The decision occurs within two alternative treatments. In the first, we provide no 
incentives and the decision on which public good to buy is left to the leader or to a public discussion 
or through private voting. In the second, we introduce monetary incentives that reward the group or 
the individual, and the decision on the public good is taken by the leader. 
The experiment involved 269 participants living in the three townships. Despite their low 
standard of living, the average level of contribution was substantial, reaching almost 45% of the 
endowment. 
Our key results deal with leadership and participatory incentives, respectively. First, subjects 
contribute significantly more when the leader is required to take the decision on the public good, 
rather than when the decision occurs through a public discussion or by private voting. This result is in 
line with African leadership style, typically non authoritarian and based on consensus. African 
societies tend to be egalitarian within age groups, but hierarchical or gerontocratic between age 
groups (Linquist and Adolph 1996). Since consensus is highly valued, decision making within levels 
can take a long time (Cosway and Anankum 1996), while between levels observance of hierarchy 
implies that consensus can be achieved relatively quickly (Dia 1994). These decision processes are 
similar to the ones used by groups in townships, where individuals speak privately or in a small group 
to the leader (or “chairperson”), who collects all the opinions and takes a final decision. Decision 
making after a collective discussion takes place very rarely and private voting is never used, 
consistent with the large size of the groups we involved in our experiment (between 17 and 34 
members), where taking decisions through a public discussion might be chaotic and ineffective. 
Second, subjects responded significantly more when they faced “participatory incentives”, a 
mechanism similar to community-led development programs which require, in general, a personal 
commitment by the community recipients of the aid. In our manipulation, subjects obtained a public 
or a private reward if the sum of all contributions reached a given threshold. These incentives turned 
out to be very effective and the high levels of individual contributions revealed also the beliefs that 
other group members would behave accordingly. This finding also reflects the evidence on 
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community development, which is more effective when the beneficiaries are active participants and 
projects are accompanied by community-building initiatives.  
Finally, we explore the interaction between leadership and incentives. While the empirical 
evidence highlights the role of the leader in driving more efficient coordination, we find that the 
incentives are very effective in enhancing cooperation and the difference of contribution between the 
leader and the other members shrinks significantly. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A: Description and history of the three townships 
The first township we took into consideration is Langa, which is Cape Town’s oldest South-African 
township, established in 1923. The area is relatively small and informal settlements could not expand 
further due to geographical constraints. Being the oldest township in Cape Town, Langa has seen 
generations of people grow up together and develop a strong sense of community pride. The 
proximity of housing in Langa was one crucial factor in promoting a high degree of neighborhood. 
The second township, Khayelitsha or “New Home”, was established in 1983 to accommodate 
informal settlement dwellers on the Cape Peninsula. People living in squatter camps or existing 
townships were housed in a newly proposed 3220-hectare site located to the South-East of the 
peninsula. The government envisaged Khayelitsha as a relocation point to accommodate all legal 
residents (the government classified people as legal if they had already lived in the area for ten years) 
of the Cape Peninsula in one new purpose-built and easily controlled township. Due to the large and 
continuous inflow of people, it is now the largest around Cape Town and the third largest township in 
South Africa. Overall Khayelitsha is young, rapidly expanding.  
The third township, Philippi, is located in an area named Cape Flats. Although the first 
community of local residents is recorded in 1833, its developments and substantial residential growth 
emerged in the early 1980s. The history and expansion of Philippi is linked to Apartheid policies. In 
fact, it increasingly became a place of refuge for people from the political conflict and violence in the 
former homelands. Moreover, the farms’ elimination in the nearby area of Mitchells Plain caused a 
number of workers to be deposed and having to move elsewhere (Adlard 2011). 
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Appendix B: Instructions 
 
 
Welcome! Thank you for arriving on time to take part in this experiment. The experiment is divided 
in two parts. You will have the opportunity to earn a total amount of 50 rands by answering two 
Questionnaires, called A and B, respectively. After the two questionnaires, you will be asked to make 
a set of choices involving the money you earned. All your answers in the questionnaires and all your 
decisions will be completely anonymous and all the information we collect will be confidential: no 
one outside our study team will have access to the information that you provide. The experiment will 
last approximately one hour and you will receive your payment at the end of the session. Please 
answer all questions, thinking that there are no better or worse answers, because the experiment 
simply aims to understand how people make decisions. 
*** 
Consent form 
Before we begin the experiment it is necessary that we hand out a form titled “Consent to participate 
in research”. This is a document used by universities to make sure that the questions we ask and the 
activities we perform during the experimental sessions do not hurt the people involved. We request 
your signature only as a proof that you have received the aforementioned information and you agree 
to participate in this experiment. 
<< Hand out consent form >> 
Now we ask to please sign the form before proceeding. The people who do not sign the form will not 
be able to participate in the experiment and earn money. Please ask any questions right now before 
signing the form. After answering questions, we will collect the signed form. 
<< Collect signed forms >> 
*** 
Part A 
We now ask you to complete Questionnaire A. There are no right or wrong answers: we are simply 
interested in learning about you and your experiences. We ask that all of you fill out the questionnaire 
at the same time. You can ask clarifications as we proceed with the questionnaire. We will make sure 
everyone has answered each question and will assist whoever needs help before proceeding with the 
help of a few facilitators who speak both English and Xhosa. 
<< Hand out Questionnaire A and pens >> 
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First, note that on the top left-hand corner of the questionnaire, in the space provided next to “ID”, 
there is the identification number you received during registration. Now we will go around the room 
making sure that everyone has completed the questionnaire.  
<< Collect questionnaires and check if they are complete >> 
We now ask you to complete Questionnaire B. Again, there are no right or wrong answers: we are 
simply interested in learning about you and your experiences. We ask that all of you fill out the 
questionnaire at the same time.  
<< Hand out questionnaire B >> 
 
Again, on the top left corner you find your ID number. The number should go in the blank space 
provided next to “ID”. Now we will go around the room making sure that everyone has completed the 
questionnaire.  
 
<< Collect questionnaires and check if they are complete >> 
 
*** 
Part B 
*** 
 
The 50 rands you have earned by completing both questionnaires is yours. Now each of you can 
decide to take it all and use it as you wish. However, since we know that your group shares common 
interests and projects, we would like to give you the opportunity to contribute part, all, or none of the 
money to a common fund that will be used for something that will be beneficial for the whole group: 
we will call it “public good”.  
Now you receive the “decision sheet” where you have to indicate your choices. In this sheet, we also 
ask you to make guesses about the choices the other participants in the session made in the previous 
situations.  
Payments 
The experiment is finished. We will proceed with payments. Each participant will receive the amount 
of money he/she earned in the two questionnaires and did not decide to contribute either to the public 
fund or to donate to the other group. 
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Consent form to participate in the research 
You have been invited to take part in this research project.  The researcher will explain the project to you in 
detail.  You should feel free to ask questions.  If you have more questions later, Daniela Grieco, the person 
mainly responsible for this study, will discuss them with you.  You must be at least 18 years old to be in this 
research project. 
Description of the project. The project aims at investigating how people make decisions between members of 
the same group and across groups. 
What will be done. If you decide to take part in this study here is what will happen:  you will answer two 
questionnaires that will allow you to earn money. Then, you will make decisions regarding the possibility to 
use all, part or none of this money to contribute to a common project for your group or for another group who 
also takes part in this experiment. 
Benefits of this study. Although there will be no direct benefit to you for taking part in this study, the 
researchers may learn more about the degree of cooperation and cohesion among people living in this area.  
Confidentiality. All the information you provide in this study is strictly confidential. None of the information 
will identify you by name.  All records will be included in a dataset in anonymous form. 
Decision to quit at any time. The decision to take part in this study is up to you.  You do not have to 
participate.  If you decide to take part in the study, you may quit at any time.  If you wish to quit for some 
reason, simply inform the experimenters of your decision. 
Rights and complaints. If you are not satisfied with the way this study is performed, you may discuss your 
complaints with Daniela Grieco, anonymously, if you choose.   
You have read the Consent Form.  Your questions have been answered.  Your signature on this form means 
that you understand the information and you agree to participate in this study.  
 
________________________     ________________________ 
Signature of Participant      Signature of Researcher 
 
_________________________     ________________________ 
Typed name       Typed name 
 
__________________________    _______________________ 
Date        Date 
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Appendix C: Questionnaires 
 
 
 
  ID number                                                                                                            
 
 
QUESTIONNAIRE A 
 
 
Before you fill out the answers, it’s important to read the brief instructions at the beginning of 
each section and details in each question. Make sure to understand the questions.  
  
In the majority of questions you will be given some possible options as answers. Please put a 
circle around the number corresponding to your answer. If you do not find your answer among 
the proposed options, you can simply write your answer, in the “Other (specify)” cell. Please 
write all your answers in CAPITAL LETTERS. 
 
 
 
SECTION 1: DEMOGRAPHIC CHARACTERISTICS 
We would ask you some information about yourself  
 
Number QUESTION ANSWER   
1.1 What is your date of 
birth? 
 
Day 
 
 
/ 
 
Month 
 
 
/ 
 
        Year 
1.2 What is your gender? Male  ..................................................................     1    
Female  ..............................................................     2 
1.3 What is your population 
group? 
African ...............................................................     1 
Coloured ............................................................   2 
White .................................................................     3 
Indian/Asian  .....................................................     4 
Other  
(Specify)_______________________________  5 
1.4 What is the main language 
you speak at home? 
 
 
 (Specify)_______________________________  
1.5 What is the highest level of 
schooling that you have 
completed?   
None ..................................................................  0 
Grade 1 ..............................................................  1 
Grade 2 ..............................................................  2 
Grade 3 ..............................................................  3 
Grade 4 ..............................................................  4 
Grade 5 ..............................................................  5 
Grade 6 ..............................................................  6 
Grade 7 ..............................................................  7 
Grade 8 ..............................................................  8 
Grade 9 ..............................................................  9 
Grade 10 ............................................................  10 
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Grade 11 ............................................................  11 
Grade 12 ............................................................  12 
Grade 13 /Post Matric ........................................  13 
College...............................................................  14 
Graduate/Post graduate ......................................  15 
Other  
(Specify)_______________________________16  
 
1.6 Where do you currently 
live? 
 
(Specify)_______________________________   
 
The place you specified is located: 
 
In the district of Cape Town ………………….     1 
In another district in South Africa .....................     2 
Outside South Africa .........................................     3 
 
1.7 Were you born in the 
community where you 
currently live? 
Yes .....................................................................  1  => Go to question 
1.10 
No ......................................................................  2  => Go to question 
1.8 
Don’t know where I was born ...........................     3  => Go to question 
1.9 
1.8 When did you move into 
the community where you 
currently live? 
  
  Year     
1.9 What is your religion? None ..................................................................  0 
Catholic .............................................................  1 
Muslim...............................................................  2 
Hinduism ...........................................................  3 
African traditional religion ................................  4 
Judaism ..............................................................  5 
Other  
(Specify)_______________________________  6 
 
 
 
 
 
SECTION 2: HOUSEHOLD COMPOSITION  
We would ask you some information about your household and people living with you 
 
Number QUESTION ANSWER 
2.1 What is your current marital 
status? 
 
Single (Never married) ......................................  1 
Currently Married/Cohabiting ...........................  2 
Divorced/Separated ...........................................  3 
Widowed ...........................................................  4 
2.2 How many children do you have?  
 
Number of your children currently alive 
2.3 How many of your children are 
currently enrolled in schools in 
the community where you live? 
Number of your children currently enrolled  
within the school community 
2.4 How many people live in your 
house, excluding yourself?  
Number of cohabitants 
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ID number                                                                                                            
 
QUESTIONNAIRE B 
 
 
As in Questionnaire A, please read the brief instructions at the beginning of each section and 
details in each question. Make sure to understand the questions. Put a circle around the number 
corresponding to your answer. If you do not find your answer among the proposed options, you 
can simply write your answer, in the “Other (specify)” cell. Please write all your answers in 
CAPITAL LETTERS. 
 
 
 
SECTION 4.  EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS 
We would like to ask you some questions about the work you do and about your earnings. We would ask also 
some questions on your household income  
 
Number QUESTION ANSWER 
4.1 What is your current main 
job activity? 
Paid employee  (private sector).......................... 1 
Paid employee  (public sector /government) ...... 2 
Self-employed with employees .......................... 3 
Self-employed without employees ..................... 4 
Housewife /Home-maker ................................... 5 
Unemployed but looking for a job ..................... 6 
Student ............................................................... 7  
Pensioner, retired, too old to work ..................... 8 
Ill or disabled ..................................................... 9 
Other  
(Specify)_______________________________  10 
4.2 Considering your current 
(last) job, do (did) you work 
throughout the year, 
seasonally, or only once in a 
while? 
I never worked ................................................... 1 => Go to question 
4.8 
I work(ed) throughout all the year ..................... 2 
I work(ed) seasonally/part of the year................ 3 
I work(ed) once in a while ................................. 4 
4.3 Considering your current 
(last) job, in what sector is 
(was) your main job activity? 
Agriculture ......................................................... 1 
Fishing ............................................................... 2 
Mining and quarrying ........................................ 3 
Manufacturing  ...................................................    4 
Building or construction .................................... 5 
Trade/retail sale  ................................................ 6 
Transport ............................................................ 7 
Public sector/government .................................. 8 
Other services .................................................... 9 
Other  
(Specify)_______________________________  10 
4.4 How are you usually paid for 
your main work? 
Cash only ........................................................... 1 
Cash and in kind ................................................ 2 
In kind only ........................................................ 3 
Not paid ............................................................. 4 
4.5 Last month, how much 
money (rands) did you earn 
from a job? 
Not paid ............................................................. 1 
Less than    1000 ................................................ 2 
More than   1000 but less than   3000 ................ 3 
More than   3000 but less than   5000 ................ 4 
More than   5000 but less than 10000 ................ 5 
More than 10000 but less than 20000 ................ 6 
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More than 20000 . .............................................. 7 
4.6 How many of other 
household members are 
currently employed? 
Number of other  
household membres   
currently employed  
4.7 What was the total income of 
your household (in rand) 
during the last month? 
 
No income .......................................................... 1 
Less  than   2000 ................................................ 2 
More than   2000 but less than   6000 ................ 3 
More than   6000 but less than 10000 ................ 4 
More than 10000 but less than 20000 ................ 5 
More than 20000 but less than 40000 ................ 6 
More than 40000 . .............................................. 7 
4.8 Does your family save a 
fraction of its monthly 
income? 
Never ................................................................. 1  
Seldom /only sometimes .................................... 2 
Often .................................................................. 3 
Always ............................................................... 4 
 
 
SECTION 5: BEHAVIOR and COMMUNITY LIFE 
We would like to ask you some questions about the way in which main decisions are taken in your household 
and the involvement of your household into the community you live 
Number QUESTION ANSWER 
5.1 Do you usually ask other 
community members’ 
opinion before taking 
decisions?  
Never ................................................................. 1 
Seldom ............................................................... 2 
Sometimes ......................................................... 3 
Often .................................................................. 4 
Always ............................................................... 5 
5.2 Do other community 
members ask your opinion 
before taking decisions? 
Never ................................................................. 1 
Seldom ............................................................... 2 
Sometimes ......................................................... 3 
Often .................................................................. 4 
Always ............................................................... 5 
5.3 How often do you chat, talk 
and spend time together with 
other people in the 
community where you live? 
Never ................................................................. 1 
A few times each year ........................................ 2 
A few times each month .................................... 3 
A few times each week ...................................... 4 
Every day ........................................................... 5 
5.4 What best describes the 
community where you live? 
A family ............................................................. 1 
A group of friends .............................................. 2 
Neighbors ........................................................... 3 
Strangers ............................................................ 4 
Other  .................................................................    5 
5.5 What best describes your 
closest neighbors? 
A family ............................................................. 1 
A group of friends .............................................. 2 
A group of people with the same origin of mine 3 
Strangers ............................................................ 4 
Other  .................................................................    5 
5.6 How much are the following 
issues a problem to you on a 
daily basis? 
Put an “X” in the corresponding 
cell. 
Not a problem A small problem A big problem 
Food    
Energy    
Hygienic condition    
Uncooperative neighbors     
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Garbage    
Lack of transports    
Poor schools    
Poor health facilities    
Lack of other services    
Lack of safety    
5.7 How much are the following 
issues a problem to the 
community where you live on 
a daily basis? 
Put an “X” in the corresponding 
cell. 
Not a problem A small problem A big problem 
Food    
Energy    
Clean water and hygienic condition    
Uncooperative neighbors     
Garbage    
Lack of transport    
Poor schools    
Poor health facilities    
Lack of other services    
Lack of safety    
5.8 Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can 
be trusted or that you need to 
be very careful in dealing 
with people?  
Please provide only one answer. 
 
Most people can be trusted ................................ 1 
Need to be very careful  ..................................... 2 
Don´t know ........................................................ 3 
 
5.9 Here is a list of qualities that 
children can be encouraged 
to learn at home.  
Which, if any, do you 
consider to be especially 
important?  
Please choose up to five.  
Good manners .................................................... 1 
Determination and perseverance ........................ 2 
Hard work .......................................................... 3 
Imagination ........................................................ 4 
Independence ..................................................... 5 
Obedience .......................................................... 6 
Religious faith .................................................... 7 
Feeling of responsibility .................................... 8 
Thrift, saving money and things ........................ 9 
Tolerance and respect for others ........................  10 
Unselfishness .....................................................  11 
 
 
 
